Terrorism and organized crime by Bovenkerk, F. & Chakra, B.A.
TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME







Analyses on Organized Crime and Terrorism have for a long time been conducted by different research communities. Only in the 1980s, when illicit drug production and trafficking were found to finance terrorist campaigns, a first beginning was made to look at both phenomena simultaneously. However, the nature of the relationship has been a matter of controversy. While some authors see close links and even convergence, others are more sceptical, pointing to the fact that a relatively small sample of  groups are constantly referred to, with little in-depth investigation. The authors hold that painstaking empirical research should be the arbiter of the controversy. For this purpose, they formulate ten key questions which such research should explore to settle the issue.

Organized crime and terrorism are usually viewed as two different forms of crime. Organized crime is generally held to focus mainly on economic profit and on acquiring as much of an illegal market share as possible, while terrorism is said to be motivated chiefly by ideological aims and by a desire for political change. The word ‘terrorism’ is not even mentioned once in Abadinsky’s handbook (1990) on Organized Crime, while in his influential study  Political Terrorism, P. Wilkinson (1974: 33) wrote, “We shall exclude from our typology criminal terrorism which can be defined as the systematic use of acts of terror for objectives of private material gain”. As a result of this distinction between organized crime and terrorism, two separate bodies of criminology literature have emerged. Research into each is funded by different programmes, and information about each is taught in different courses. Whatever is discovered by crime investigation specialists who scrutinize both phenomena tends to be kept confidential and their knowledge and insights are not widely shared.

 A Hypothesis of Convergence

In the last two decades, suggestions have been made that there might be some links between the two phenomena. This began with the discovery of narco-terrorism in the 1980s when it was found that drug trafficking was also used to advance the political objectives of certain governments and terrorist organizations. Terrorists are happy to seize any opportunity to call what they are doing “political”, wrote R. Ehrenfeld, while drug traffickers were always seen as purely criminal.  “When the two combine, terrorist organizations derive benefits from the drug trade with no loss of status, and drug traffickers who have forged an alliance with terrorists become more formidable and gain in political clout” (Ehrenfeld, 1990:xix). This notion has now been adopted by various authors. “Although they are distinct phenomena that should not be confused,” A.P. Schmid (1996: 40) wrote in an influential first article on this new phenomenon, “there are links” and “there is some common ground”. 

In recent books on both of these phenomena, references are also made to other forms of crime. In Organized Crime, M. Lyman and G. Potter (1977: 307) devoted a special chapter to terrorism and noted that “political agendas and profit motivation may be concurrent variables in many acts of terrorism”. In The New Terrorism, W. Laqueur (1999: 211) wrote an entire chapter about the cooperation between the two because “in some cases a symbiosis between terrorism and organized crime has occurred that did not exist before”.

On 28 September 2001, less than three weeks after the dramatic events of September 11 in New York and Washington, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a wide-ranging anti-terrorism resolution (SC res. 1373) in which it “notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials”. Yet is still unclear what exactly the “close connection” consists of, and  further research is warranted. In a paper presented at a  conference of the International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme (ISPAC), A.P. Schmid (2004:191) suggests there may be connections that take the form of associations, alliances, cooperation, confluence, convergence or symbiosis. Other analysts (Williams & Savona, 1995: 3; Williams & Godson, 2002:320; Schweitzer, 2002: 288) went further and suggested the theoretical possibility that in concrete cases, terrorism can change into organized crime and vice versa.  Some (Makarenko, 2001:22-24) even consider the possibility that terrorism and organized crime might totally converge and become one and the same. T. Makarenko (2003) makes an interesting classification effort by placing various types of convergence on a continuum with organized crime at one end and terrorism at the other. This opens the question: how do specific underground organisations move from one type to the other?

Various authors keep referring to more or less the same examples, the FARC in Colombia, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, guerrilla fighters in Chechnya, the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, the IMU in Uzbekistan and a few others. It is striking that none of them provide a thorough empirical analysis of any of these cases and the evidence cited never goes much deeper than a good media account. This is not meant to belittle good journalism but even good reporters may miss to ask the right analytical questions for lack of an adequate analytical  framework.

Some specialists in organized crime or terrorism doubt there are really any clear connections between the two. A.P. Schmid  cited two authorities in his ISPAC paper: Mark Galeotti who noted that “until now, fears of international alliances between terrorists and criminals have proven to be exaggerated” (Schmid, 2004:203) and Louise Shelley who suggested that “[t]he links between organized criminals and terrorists are much less frequent than the links between organized criminals and politicians” (Schmid, 2004: 197). R.T. Naylor (2002: 56-57) found some examples of opportunistic alliances between the two. Indeed some guerrilla organizations or some of their militants do resort to simple criminality. Yet upon closer inspection some supposed alliances often prove to be merely ephemeral, or, in the words of Naylor, “[a]t the end of their cooperation the two groups usually end up on opposite sides of the barricades”. It is striking that most authors generally fail to present empirically founded analyses to prove their case. They are making little more than educated guesses, according to A.P. Schmid.

Who is right? What we would like to do in the following is, first, survey the theoretical considerations presented by the supporters of the confluence hypothesis. It is not enough to demonstrate, as is generally done, that there are structural similarities between the two types of crime. We also need to understand the mechanisms enabling them to work together. Subsequently, we would like to address the arguments of authors who deny the existence of any such connections or do not feel they are significant in any way. This brings us to the question – in the event of any such links or merger – which of the two is likely to emerge in the long run as the dominant type? When it comes to combating this new phenomenon, this is of essential importance. In a short final section, a number of central questions that should play a role in concrete empirical research are presented.  
 
Why Links or even Metamorphosis?

A number of political and economic developments have brought terrorism and organized crime into each other’s territory. There are also a number of clear structural similarities that would appear to make collaboration advantageous for both of them. In addition, both types of organizations can be expected to attract the kind of personality types that reconcile the two types of criminal activities. We shall briefly address these three complexes of factors. 

Firstly there is the issue of globalisation. In this era of accelerated global interaction, transnational organized crime and international terrorism are flourishing. There are thousands of criminal organizations and hundreds of terrorist ones in the world. H. Hess, who did a great deal of research on terrorism in the past, noted: “When I look back today at the time of the Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Weathermen, the whole range of phenomena we studied as terrorism 20 years ago, I tend to become nostalgic (…). Most terrorism was rather provincial” (Hess 2003: 345). P. Williams and R. Godson (2002: 311) writing about organized crime today and comparing it with the situation in the past concluded that it “has reached levels in the post-Cold War world that have surprised even close observers”. The world has opened up, the borders have faded or are no longer as well guarded, the market is globalized, financial and commercial mergers and the deregulation of state intervention provide new opportunities, communication technology is presenting unanticipated new technological possibilities and large-scale migration across the globe has created new emigrant and refugee communities that can serve as recruitment bases and as hiding places (Makarenko 2001: 22-24). 

The authors favouring the convergence thesis note a similarity between people who commit crimes and people who throw bombs. Both have a common enemy, the state in general and its law enforcement agencies in particular. Both types of criminals operate in secrecy, in the underworld, and they use the same or similar infrastructures for their activities and the same networks of corruption and white-collar crime. Both use the same type of tactics: they engage in cross-border smuggling, money laundering, counterfeiting, kidnapping, extortion and various kinds of violence.

 They cross paths, they help or submit to one another which makes them dependent on each other. Transnational organized crime can use the power apparatus of political crime to create the social and economic context that makes its profitable activities feasible. Terrorists, on the other hand, need funding to push their own agendas. When terrorists groups are still small, they do not require many resources, but when they grow into insurgent or guerrilla groups that aspire to control a larger region they have greater needs (Naylor 2002). 

The end of the Cold War, the existence of weak and even failed states,  the rise of new surrogate or shadow states – these are only a few of the political changes that offer new opportunities for underworld organizations. The end of the Cold War meant in many cases an end to the sponsoring of terrorist organizations by states from some actors in the two power blocks. Some organizations had no choice but to look for new sources of funding, which, in many cases, meant either engaging in organized  crime activities themselves or in extorting money from criminal organizations and legitimate business via ‘revolutionary taxation’ (Schmid,  1996:69) 

Weak states characterized by limited state control easily fall prey to organized crime - Sicily and Colombia are the standard examples - but they can also be targeted by terrorists. Failed states in Africa (Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia) or Asia (Afghanistan) made it possible for organized crime to work with national kleptocrats or local warlords who plundered their countries’ diamonds, gold, tropical timber, exotic species of animals, etc. The distinction between terrorism and organized crime becomes obscured when warlords utilize terrorist methods as well.

New economic formations are emerging which take little notice of national borders. They follow their own logic of territorial development in the form of shadow states. A cultural anthropologist from Notre Dame University (Indiana, USA), terms them “surrogate sovereigns” (Nordstrom, 2000) while an Italian economist refers to them as “shell states”(Napoleoni, 2004). They are largely hidden from view and they provide some of the world’s unstable economies and marginal political regions with arms, mercenaries and luxury commodities. Figurations of this kind collaborate with ambitions political entrepreneurs who aspire to both economic power and political control. 

The structural similarities are striking. Organized crime researchers never tire of noting how few classical large-scale pyramidal or bureaucratically organized groups there exist in today’s underworld. Students of terrorism point out that cell structures and networks rather than big organisations are becoming the rule. To a certain degree, both are right. Yet the terms organized crime and terrorism are each used to refer to a range of very different criminal and political violence activities.

On the one hand, there are groups that organize crime by using private violence or the threat thereof; their crime consists mainly of organized extortion. Their role is to provide a safe environment for signing “business” contracts, to make sure that “agreements” are kept and that disputes between “business” partners are settled. They perform this role in places where the state completely or partially fails to guarantee contracts, such as Sicily (Gambetta 1993) or post-1989 Russia (Varese 2001, Volkov 2002). They are also active in places where the state de facto withdraws its own influence (the sale of alcohol, drugs or pornography, providing premises for prostitution or gambling). This kind of organized crime dominates all the illegal and some of the legal activities in a certain territory, whether it is a country, a region or a neighbourhood, and tends to establish a monopoly position (Schelling 1984). It may, as is the case with certain activities in Russia, indeed take the form of a hierarchic organization. 

On the other hand, there is a type of organized crime that is linked to the production, smuggling and sale of illegal goods and services: trafficking in drugs or arms, smuggling of people, trafficking in human beings, especially women, loan sharking, trading in exotic species of animals and tropical timber, dumping toxic waste and so forth. Organizations that engage in these activities have no territorial aspirations and have every reason to stay out of the way of the authorities and their law enforcement agencies. Commercial crime organizations like this are far more numerous than the branches of the Mafia, Triads or Yakuza (which are predominantly examples of the first category). However, they are not stable and bureaucratically organized enterprises. Rather, they consist of networks of small and flexible groups of criminals or cells. This loose form of illegal business is functional in the competitive and changeable world of illegality, making its practitioners less visible to the law enforcement agencies (Reuter 1983). 

Since there are so many categories of terrorist organizations, it is obviously hard to make any general statements about them. Though it is certainly true that all terrorist groups tend to frighten people by using extreme violence in their efforts to influence political developments, studies of concrete terrorist groups and their activities tend to support the  notion that the differences among such groups are greater than the similarities (Cronin 2002).  Terrorists aspire to left-wing or right-wing political aims, they champion the cause of oppressed minorities, they are religiously motivated or pursue single issue goals ( e.g. the Animal Liberation Front, campaigns to close abortion clinics). 

It is highly probable that the type of terrorism determines in part how it is organized and whether or not there is any collaboration with organized crime. The chance of cooperation with organized crime would seem to be greater in the case of politically motivated terrorist organizations than, for example, with “crazy” groups. There are terrorist cells which operate in complete independence, but there are also terrorists who are (or were) supported or even totally organized by (foreign) governments. One hypothesis might be that organized crime and terrorists work together more easily if and when they are supported, encouraged or helped in some way by a government or parts of one, such as intelligence agencies.

Let us get back to the simple structure. One feature terrorist organizations have in common with organized crime of the smuggling organization variety is that they do not always have stable and well organized units; they are far more likely to consist of agglomerates of autonomous units. A.P. Schmid (2004:194)) writes about the self-reliant lone wolf terrorist and cites V. Tishkov, who sees a paradigm for the future in this type of “leaderless resistance” terrorist. The majority of terrorist groups never get past a formative stage. If they grow into insurgent groups or guerrilla armies, that is when the need to become better organized emerges.  

There are bound to be differences in the forms of collaboration between these variants of organized crime and terrorism. We can assume it is more profitable for terrorists to collaborate with production, smuggling and sales organizations than with organized crime of the type that organizes the underworld as a whole. And vice versa, it is more advantageous for organized crime to work with substantial organizations that really exert political influence than with the lone fanatic who attacks unexpectedly and only generates temporary panic.  

To a certain extent, there is also a similarity in the type of persons involved in the two types of crime. Both types of organizations tend to recruit the majority of their members from the same reservoir of marginal segments of the population, which are subject to social, cultural or political frustration (strain theory). Both types of organizations consist of people who are prepared to take risks, enjoy excitement and thrills, and look down on the norms of regular society. There may be a division of labour here. Terrorist groups might bring forth leaders and the criminal underworld may produce people with the necessary operational and survival skills. 

	In addition, they have a major driving force in common, the yearning for power. In the first instance, this does not seem to be such a serious motivating factor. The prevailing image of the terrorist is one of  a fanatic willing to sacrifice his or her life for a political ideal. If terrorists engage in suicide missions they forfeit chances of exercising power in this world. The element of power does not often surface in the literature on the root causes of terrorism. However, many terrorists, of course, go on living and do not risk their own lives needlessly. Their personal profiles often reveal how much they enjoy fame and power (Hoffman 2002: 169-180). It is not without reason that so many terrorist movements are named after their charismatic leader. M. Ignatieff posed the question how terrorists  account for the fact that in the name of higher ideals, they violate fundamental human rights such as the right to life and the right to freedom. He calls the ones whose true motivation is profit- and power- oriented “opportunistic nihilists” (Ignatieff, 2002)​[3]​. The life stories of prominent contemporary terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden or Ramzi Yousef show that many of them belong to this category as do some of the leaders of the Colombian FARC, the IRA and Abu Sayyaf (Reeve 1999). It is also striking that many  present-day political actors in Lebanon who began their careers as militia men have also profited from drug cultivation; it has certainly strengthened their political positions (Ehrenfeld 1990). 

The true value of the power theme has not yet been assessed in the field of organized crime either. In examining why people join the Mafia, the first rationale given is usually the desire to get rich. Yet after studying the testimonies of Italian turncoats, L. Paoli (2003: 151-154) concluded that the thirst for power, especially local power, is probably always a more important driving force than  the mere desire for wealth. Organized crime leaders always claim to operate in secrecy and obey their own rule about keeping silent. Yet a good number of autobiographical gangster memoirs reveal how much they too enjoy fame and power (Firestone 1993: 197-220). In this sense, the personality of the gangster bears a number of similarities to that of the “opportunistic nihilist” (Bovenkerk 2000).

Do such similarities make it easier to comprehend the connections and possible symbiosis? How can the phenomenon of terrorism becoming organized crime and vice versa be explained?  When do rebels turn into felons? Or felons into rebels? These are once again questions to be addressed in detailed case studies. All we can do at this point is to suggest a number of possibilities. 

1. 	In organized crime and terrorist movements, the leaders are frequently very prominent, in fact the groups are often named after their leader. What happens if the leader dies or goes to prison? Is it conceivable that the terrorist organization degenerates into a gang of robbers? This seems to have been the case with the group headed by the Uzbek rebel leader Juma Namangani who is assumed to have perished in 2001, after which his gang went on randomly kidnapping for ransom. 

2.	 What happens after insurgent terrorists lose the justification for their existence because the authorities have settled the political issue they focused on? They might have become so accustomed to a certain life style that they can not give it up. Perhaps they have taken too much of a liking to exerting the kind of violence that is typical of terrorism. This appears to be one of the greatest obstacles facing Colombian presidents seeking a peaceful solution to the problem of terrorism. Rebel armies like the FARC and the ELN have built a life for themselves based on protection taxes from drug lords and kidnapping for ransom. Some sections of them may even have developed into drug trafficking organizations themselves.

3.	 What happens to a Mafia family in dire straits because of the authorities’ success in combating organized crime? Drug king Pablo Escobar had no qualms murdering politicians, judges, policemen and even journalists or intimidating them with techniques from the terrorists’ repertoire. The Italian mafia has also tried to intimidate the authorities and keep anti-mafia legislation from being passed by exploding car bombs at public buildings like the Galeria degli Uffizi in Florence. Some crime theorists suggest that creating a general state of fear of terrorism promotes the advancement of organized crime. Plausible – but is this really true? 

4. 	There is also the possibility of widespread degeneration in the event of a lengthy armed conflict. A civil war “may create a generation whose only skills, at what should be their peak productive years, are military; they therefore turn easily to criminal activity for survival even after the conflict winds down” (Naylor 2002: 82). If this is true, the future looks bleak for countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone since so many children have become accustomed to soldiering and looting.

Opposite Views on a Possible Nexus 

In his report before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Frank J. Cilluffo, senior policy analyst at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), stated, “Organized crime and terrorism have two different goals. Organized crime’s business is business. The less attention brought to their lucrative enterprises the better. The goal of terrorism is the opposite. A wide-ranging public profile is often the desired effect.  Despite this, the links between organized crime and terrorism are becoming stronger in regard to the drug trade”. 

The division between the two is not based on the crimes committed, since they are partly the same, but on the reasons motivating the offenders. In the previous section, we note that both types of organizations recruit their members from frustrated segments of the population. Yet there is an important difference. Individuals who participate in organized crime often come from the lower socio-economic classes, while it is not unusual for terrorists to be from the middle classes. This difference is not insignificant. There are persons among terrorists, brainwashed or not, who are solely driven by ideological principles and a political conviction. For them terrorism is a way to force the authorities around the world to give in to their political, economic and social demands. They are not fond of the idea of collaborating with criminals in the traditional sense of the word, since this would bring with it the real risk of losing political credibility. In public at least, they downplay any involvement with criminals. Terrorists strive for an increased political following and look often to the courtroom as a place to convince the world of the justness of their causes (Schmid 1996: 66). 

To real career criminals, the conduct of politically motivated terrorists appears incomprehensible if not  downright “weird”. Why would anyone take such extreme risks without any prospect of getting rich in the end? Who would want to openly confront the authorities instead of evading or corrupting them? Is it not much more sensible to keep illegal activities as low-key and hidden as possible? Is it not foolish to draw attention to yourself by using disproportional violence? The opportunities for organized crime are largely based on the idea of exploiting the existing imperfections in the economic and moral system of the state (the prohibition of certain substances such as drugs, the shortage of cheap legal workers, the high costs of processing waste, and so forth). Viewed from this perspective, organized crime is conservative. Solving social and political problems would put it out of business. 

On the other hand, it is often surprising how easily ideological differences can be settled in the underworld. Ultranationalist Turks united in the Grey Wolves and Kurd activists who joined forces in the PKK were publicly each other’s fiercest enemies in Turkey as well as in the European and American diaspora. Yet when it comes to smuggling heroin or people, the underworld is only too happy to work together (Bovenkerk and Yesilgöz, 1998). In Lebanon all political rivals, whether Christian, Sunnite, Shi’ite Muslim or Druze, profited from the drug trade. War between ideologies stops, as it were, at the edge of cannabis and poppy fields. There are many more examples of this kind. This mainly holds true of the leaders in both realms. They might come from different social backgrounds, but the common desire for power and the personal wealth that goes with it can easily steer the collaboration in the direction of predominantly organized crime. 





In this article we repeatedly referred to the need for empirical research into possible links between terrorists and criminals. As G. Andreopoulos (1991: 226) noted, “individual cases rather than a series of abstract assumptions can credibly constitute the building blocks of theory formation”. In our view, in all the cases where there is a known or plausible collaboration between terrorists and organized crime, the following ten questions, based on the preliminary analysis offered here, might be helpful as  guidelines. 

1.	Under what political constellations do these forms of collaboration emerge?
2.	 Which types of organized crime can easily go together with which variants of terrorism? And which types are less compatible? 
3.	Is there evidence of intervention by national or foreign authorities regarding the promotion of a collaboration process? 
4.	Which structural features possessed by such organizations point towards convergence?
5.	Which types of alliance and convergence occur most frequently?
6.	What exactly is their collaboration based on? What do the two organizations exploit in each other?
7.	How are differences in value orientations and class backgrounds of	 conventional criminals and terrorists resolved?
8.	Is there indeed evidence of a clear resemblance in how they strive for power? 
9.	Is all organized crime strictly centered around profit making or are there exceptions where certain activities serve to acquire political spoils or gains?
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